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THE QUEST FOR CLEAR LAND TITLESWHITHER POSSIBILITIES OF REVERTER

AND RIGHTS OF ENTRY?
JAmEs A.

WEBSTER, JR.*

The future interests in real property known as "possibilities of
reverter" and "rights of entry for condition broken" may not cause
nightmares to title lawyers and their clients-but they well might.'
This article is intended to espouse the idea that possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for condition broken are often unreasonable and undesirable impediments to the free alienation of land and
are in need of legislation to curb-their harmful effects.
So long as a law permits the creation and existence of a particular type of interest in land and so long as it serves a socially
valuable purpose, it should be retained. When, however, limitations
on the use or alienation of land cease to be beneficial and socially
desirable such limitations should be curbed or prohibited. In most
cases, perhaps, the individual landowner should be given the widest
latitude of freedom to make his land usable and salable and to
promote its value in the manner that he deems best. As to his own
land the individual landowner is probably as knowledgeable as anyone concerning the way the land should be developed, what restrictions, servitudes, covenants, or conditions should be created to
maximize its potential profitable utilization and value. The homemade, self-taught "expert" in land development is not a rarity.
When the landowner's ideas of making his lands usable, productive or profitable to their maximum extent do no real violence
to society and its needs, he should be given the broadest leeway in
efforts to achieve the total advantages deriving from his ownership.
The total advantages of the ownership of land should include the
right to impose reasonable and desirable safeguards curtailing, di* Professor of Law, Wake Forest College.
'Possible liability threatens title lawyers if they do not exclude from their
certificates of title potential possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for
condition broken arising in the record at a point of time beyond that covered

by title searches. Possible loss threatens clients if they know their titlesearching lawyer has not certified against the existence of claims under
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for condition broken beyond the

period included in the title examination.
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recting or restricting the methods and purposes for which the lands
might be used by purchasers and subsequent owners when he makes
a conveyance or devise of his land. The landowner, in imposing
restrictive devices circumscribing the extent of subsequent ownership of "his" land because of restrictions, servitudes, covenants
or conditions, can usually be relied upon to act rationally. He places
a given restriction or limitation on the land for what he conceives,
in the exercise of his best judgment, to be to his own economic benefit and to the economic benefit of the land, to promote and improve
its usefulness and value. On the whole, his expertise and foresight
in accurately predicting future needs and values is perhaps not substantially inferior to that of any other group. In addition, the landowner using restrictive devices as a private land use planner can
usually be relied on for rationality because of his own peculiar
economic relationship to the land which is too often lacking in
official and professional land use planners. There is a strong public
interest under the free enterprise system in the preservation of each
individual landowner's control over the terms of the transfer and
devolution of his property, both by inter vivos transfers and by
testate succession.
An equally important public policy is that property should be
freely alienable and usable, i.e., capable of being transfered for
utilization to meet society's demands. Free alienability is based on
the policy that land assets, as other assets, should be largely manipulable by the "living" and not unreasonably immobilized by the
2
"dead."))
As both policies are designed to maximize the benefits of land
ownership for a particular generation, they inevitably conflict. If a
present landowner has power to dispose of his land under any
conditions or restrictions designed to increase its value and utility
to him and his successors, the conditions or restrictions may operate
to render the land inalienable by future generations.
It is the purpose of this paper to inquire, in light of these conflicting policies, as to the social utility of the land restricting devices
which allow the creation of possibilities of reverter and rights of
entry for condition broken. Are there positive beneficial reasons for
the retention of these common law future interests? Do the ad' Each generation should have the power of providing for subsequent ones
as it thinks best, but it should not encroach on succeeding generations' free
use of land. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 268 (4th ed. 1942).
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vantages from the legality of these interests to individual landowners
outweigh the possible harm done to society generally by creating
clogs on otherwise good real estate titles? Is there a feasible way to
preserve the grantor's or devisor's freedom of disposition and accomplish his immediate objectives, and yet limit these interests so
as to assure future generations' freedom to use and alien the land
without the controls, which may be completely useless, imposed by
a former owner perhaps long dead?
I. THE INTERESTS DESCRIBED
It is no longer debatable in most jurisdictions, including North
Carolina, that the future interests in realty known as the possibility
of reverter3 and the right of entry for condition broken4 can be
created as concomitant by-products existing whenever the possessory
estates known as the determinable fee simple estate or the fee simple
estate subject to a condition subsequent, respectively, are granted 'or
devised.
A. Possibility of Reverter
A possibility of reverter is an untransferred potential residuum
of an estate remaining in a grantor and his heirs or in a devisor's
heirs when an estate of fee simple determinable is created in real
property either by deed or will. The estate of fee simple determinable is created when apt and appropriate words are used by a grantor
or devisor indicative of an intent on the part of the grantor or devisor that a fee simple estate conveyed or devised will expire automatically upon the happening of a certain event or upon the discontinuance of certain existing facts.5 Typical language creating
such estates may specify that a grantee or devisee shall have land
"until" some event occurs, or "while," "during" or "for so long as"
SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 283 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter
SIMES & SMITH]; McCall, Estates on Condition and on Special
Limitation in North Carolina,19 N.C.L. REv. 334, 338-39 (1941) [hereinafter
cited as McCall]. See, e.g., Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n v.
Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983
(1956); Elmore v. Austin, 232 N.C. 13, 59 S.E.2d 205 (1950).
' SIMES & SMITH § 251; McCall 346-48. See, e.g., Brittain v. Taylor,
168 N.C. 271, 84 S.E. 280 (1915).
'RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 44 (1936), provides: "An estate in fee simple
determinable is created by any limitation which, in an otherwise effective
conveyance of land
(a) creates an estate in fee simple; and
(b) provides that the estate shall automatically expire upon the occurrence of a stated event."
'

cited as
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some state of facts continues to exist. This interest reposes in the
grantor or his heirs or in a devisor's heirs from the effectiveness of
the deed or will creating a determinable fee simple estate until the
occurrence or non-occurrence of whatever limits the duration of the
estate granted or devised. Upon the occurrence of the event or the
cessation of the state of facts limiting the determinable fee simple
estate, the possessory estate of the grantee or devisee terminates
and the reposing interest in the grantor, his heirs or the devisor's
heirs is immediately converted and activated from a mere future
possibility of an estate to an existing possessory estate. The possibility of reverter operates automatically, without the necessity of
any act of re-entry, the institution of any lawsuit or the intervention
of any court to revest the possessory title into the grantor, his heirs
or the devisor's heirs.'
B. Right of Entry For Condition Broken
The future interest in real property known as the right of entry
for condition broken 7 arises after the creation of the possessory
estate known as the fee simple estate subject to a condition subsequent." Typical language for the creation of a fee simple estate
subject to a condition subsequent specifies that a grantee or devisee
shall have a fee simple estate "on condition that," "provided that,"
but "to be null and void if" a certain event occurs, or to be forfeited
upon the happening or failure of continuance of certain facts. This
interest is the retention of a "right," or more accurately a "power,"
to re-enter the premises or to institute an action to terminate the
grantee's or devisee's possessory estate when the forfeiting event
occurs. Unlike the possibility of reverter, it does not operate automatically to terminate and divest the existing possessory estate in
order to revest the possessory title in the grantor or his heirs or into
the heirs of a devisor creating the interest. In order to convert the

' RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 56 (1956) ; SIMES & SMITH § 293. See,
e.g., Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88
S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956); Elmore v. Austin,
232 N.C. 13, 59 S.E.2d 205 (1950).
The right of entry for condition broken is more accurately called a
"power
of termination." RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 155 (1936).
8
RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 45 (1936), provides: "An estate in fee
simple subject to a condition subsequent is created by any limitation which,
in an otherwise effective conveyance of land,
(a) creates an estate infee simple; and
(b) provides that upon the occurrence of a stated event the conveyor or his
successor in interest shall have the power to terminate the estate so created."
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interest into a possessory estate in the grantor, his heirs or in the
heirs of a devisor, there must be positive action on the part of the
owner of the right of entry interest.9 He must re-enter the lands
upon the happening of the event entitling him to forfeit the possessory estate of the grantee or devisee and their successors or he
must bring an action at law evincing an election to forfeit the possessory estate." Until the grantor, his heirs or the devisor's heirs
manifest an election to terminate the estate of the grantee or devisee,
by making an entry on the land and actually taking it, or by bringing
an action at law to recover the land from the holder of the possessory
estate, the possessory estate will continue even after occurrence of
the event giving rise to a power of forfeiture."
C. Comparison
While there are technical distinctions between possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry for condition broken these are often
unrecognized by the practicing bar and the courts. These differences
arise out of the "automatic time bomb"' 2 characteristic attributed to
possibilities of reverter which serves to terminate the estate of fee
simple determinable ipso facto upon the occurrence of the limiting
event. This "automaticity" of the possibility of reverter is to be
contradistinguished from the necessity for affirmative action required of the owner of a right of entry to terminate a fee simple
estate on condition subsequent upon the occurrence of a specified
event and to get back the possessory title. While in a particular
case the nomenclature of the future interest involved is important
and may be determinative of rights in particular property,"3 for most
1 AmERICAN LAW or PROPERTY § 4.9
oRESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 57 (1936).

1

(Casner ed. 1952).

Brittain v. Taylor, 168 N.C. 271, 84 S.E. 280 (1915). "The law books
teem with cases fixing the principle that an estate once vested cannot be
defeated by a condition or forfeiture without some act on the part of the
grantor or his heirs by which to take advantage of the condition or forfeiture,
even when the words of the condition are 'the estate shall therefore be void
and of no effect,' which words have the same legal import as 'ipso facto
void.'" Phelps v. Chesson, 34 N.C. 195, 199-200 (1851).
" McCall 335.
" For instance, the distinction between a possibility of reverter and a
right of entry for condition broken may create different rights and liabilities.
If the contingent event occurs whereupon a determinable fee expires or a fee
simple subject to a condition subsequent is rendered terminable, and an entry
or action to effect re-entry is pending, it may be legally material to determine
which of the future interests is involved:
(a) Where taxes imposing personal liability are assessed on the land.
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Dunham, Possibilitiesof Reverter and Powers of Termination--Fraternalor
Identical Twins?, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 215, 220 (1953).
(b) Where a third person is injured on the land due to negligent omission
to maintain the premises in a safe condition. See Cassity v. Welsh, 319
Mass. 615, 67 N.E.2d 226 (1946).
(c) Where some third person commits a tort injuring the premises or
takes possession of the premises, in determining the proper party plaintiff to
bring an action to redress the wrong or to recover possession. See Barren
County Bd. of Educ. v. Jordan, 249 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1952); Webster County
Bd. of Educ. v. Gentry, 233 Ky. 35, 24 S.W.2d 910 (1930).
(d) Where the specified event determining or making the possessory
estate terminable is illegal or against public policy. See Charlotte Park &
Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956), involving the grant of a golf course to a city
under circumstances creating a possibility of reverter in the event the golf
course was used by other than -white persons. The North Carolina Supreme
Court held that since the city took a determinable fee simple estate, and since
the grantor retained a possibility of reverter, the city's possessory estate
would terminate ipso facto in the event that Negroes used the course. The
court reasoned that since the reverter provision operated automatically and
without the necessity of any judicial enforcement by the state courts of
North Carolina (without any "state action"), there was no violation of the
first section of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution
nor of the principles relating thereto set forth in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948). But see Robinson v. Mansfield, 2 RAcE REL. L. REP. 445
(Ariz. Super. Ct. 1956); Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 136
Colo. 265, 316 P.2d 252 (1957). See generally SIMES & SAITH § 285 at
nn.42.5, 42.10; 8 HASTINGs L.J. 96 (1956); 9 VAND. L. Rnv. 561 (1956).
There the authors conclude that a possibility of reverter predicated to take
effect upon use of land by members of a particular race would not withstand
the challenge of constitutionality, their theories apparently being that the
state court's failing to prevent the revesting of title constitutes at least "passive state action" or "state sanction" of a state of law allowing a discriminatory practice. It is their view that whenever a determinable fee is based on
an invalid limitation, illegal or against public policy, such limitation is
inoperative and the estate should become an absolute fee simple.
(e) Where the doctrine of waiver is raised as a defense against termination of the possessory estate after the occurrence of a specified event. In the
case of a right of entry for condition broken, the person who has the power
to terminate the possessory estate may be held to have waived his option of
forfeiture if he fails to take action to terminate the possessory estate within
a reasonable time. SIMES & SMITH § 258. Since no affirmative action is
required to revest the possessory title into the holder of a possibility of
reverter, he is not put to any election and mere inactivity should not constitute a waiver. Goldstein, Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter
as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land, 54 HARv. L. REv. 248, 272 (1940).
(f) Where the right to mesne profits accruing between the date of the
happening of the terminating event and any re-entry or assertion of right
of re-entry is involved. Dunham, supra at 219.
(g) Where, as in some jurisdictions, the question of alienability depends
on whether the future interest is a possibility of reverter or a right of entry
for condition broken, the former being held alienable more frequently. In
1961, North Carolina provided for the alienability of both in N.C. GENq,
STAT. § 39-6.3 (Supp. 1963).
For discussion of the alienability of these
interests prior to 1961, see McCall 361.
(h) Where, as in some jurisdictions, the applicability of longer or shorter
statutes of limitations for acquiring title by adverse possession may depend
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purposes the practicing title lawyer considers all possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for condition broken collectively as
"reverter rights." For most title purposes it is immaterial whether
a possessory estate is subject to automatic termination or .merely
subject to divestment in the hands of the owner of the possessory
estate by entry or suit upon the happening of some specified event.
From the point of view of the title lawyer either presents the same
danger-the potential destruction of the possessory estate. For this
reason problems relating to these interests, the needs for limiting
them, and the solutions available to minimize their continuation
when they become useless are not dissimilar and will be treated alike
in this paper.
II.

CLOGS ON ALIENABILITY

A. The Title Searcher's Problems
At the outset it will be well to set the problems concerning the
evils of unregulated possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for
condition broken into the context of the title searcher's practice to
determine if real problems exist.' 4 What are the problems caused by
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for condition broken
to the practicing lawyer engaged in real property conveyancing and
title searching?
upon whether the rights asserted are under a possibility of reverter or a right
of entry for condition broken. Dunham, supra at 229.
For enumeration of the differences, see LEACH, CASES ON FUTURE
INTERESTS 21 (2d ed. 1940); 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY If 191 (1950);
Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land: Condition Subsequent and
Determinable Fees, 27 TEXAS L. REv. 158 (1948). For suggestion that
practically all these so-called differences have no real basis, see Dunham,
Possibilities of Reverter and Powers of Terminatioil--Fraternaor Identical

Twins?, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 215 (1953).

It is suggested that the illusory

doctrinal distinctions between possibilities of reverter and powers of termina-

tion are a result only of semantic labels often conveniently manipulated by

the judiciary to achieve desired, if unpredictable, results. Chaffin, Reverters,
Rights of Entry, and Executory Interests: Semantic Confusion and Mhe
Tying Up of Land, 31 FoRDEAm L. REv. 303, 320 (1962). It is further
suggested that there should be no real difference in treatment of these two

types of future interests. By converting all determinable fee simple estates

into estates fee simple subject to condition subsequent, Kentucky recently
abolished the doctrinal distinction. Ky. REv. STAT. § 381.218 (1962).

"'If anything is to be done about present evils of unregulated possibilities
of reverter and rights of entry for condition broken, property lawyers will
have to take the initiative. No lay emotion or voter appeal can be stirred
sufficiently to induce sponsorship and passage of legislation concerning
subjects about which the lay public knows so little.
be to title searching attorneys.

The initial appeal must
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An ordinary title search may not necessarily disclose a possibility
of reverter or right of entry for condition broken. A simple illustration of this assertion may be desirable:
In 1864, 0 deeded land to A and his heirs on the express condition
that the land was to be used only for residential purposes. It was
provided that in the event the land is ever used for other than
residential purposes, the grantor and his heirs shall have the right
to re-enter the land and terminate the estate of A and his heirs.
Assume the deed to A and his heirs was duly recorded in 1864
when executed, which would include recordation of the condition
creating the right of entry (power of termination). Assume
further, however, that there were subsequent conveyances by A
and his successors in 1874, 1884, 1894, 1904, 1914, 1924, 1934,
1944, and in 1954, all of these subsequent deeds omitting the condition that the land is to be used only for residential purposes. A
client wishes to buy the land from the 1954 grantee and while the
land has been used for all these years for residential purposes the
current prospective buyer wishes to use the land for commercial or
manufacturing purposes. He employs an attorney to search the
title.
In the foregoing illustration the title searching attorney will not
discover through an ordinary title search the right of re-entry provision and its vital limitation on the use to which the land may be
put, although it appears as a matter of record in 1864.Y5 When he
locates the chain of title of the current prospective grantor and no
liens or encumbrances existing within the thirty, forty or sixty-year
period of his title search appear, he will certify an indefeasible record
title. But when his client, the purchaser, starts building a commercial
building on the land, the numerous heirs of the grantor (or their
grantees now under section 39-6.3 of the General Statutes1") may
come in and elect to exercise their power to terminate the possessory
estate of the purchaser. Unless the attorney limits the period of
time covered by the certificate of "record title" which he furnishes
to a purchaser or lender for whom he searches the title, he would be
"An empirical jaunt by the writer to a number of real estate specialists
in North Carolina elicited the information that an ordinary title search covers
a period varying from twenty to forty years. For title insurance companies
to insure a title to real estate, a search for a minimum of sixty years is
required by the principal companies doing business in North Carolina. The
minimum is usually also the maximum unless special circumstances warrant
a search for a longer period.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. 39-6.3 (Supp. 1963). This statute permits inter vivos
and testamentary conveyances of future interests.
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liable to the purchaser or lender if the title certified is terminated
by the occurrence of some specified forfeiting condition subsequent.
In the event the lawyer does limit the period of time covered by his
certificate of title, and thus certifies his responsibility only for the
accuracy of the title certificate for the period covered therein, the
purchaser or lender is then relegated to the position of having no
protection at all against forfeiting conditions created perhaps only
one link of title beyond that covered by the title searcher's search
and his certificate. In short, under current real estate title practices,
there is an existing gap in the protection afforded by an ordinary
title search under the recording statutes of North Carolina.
There is another alternative to this "'gambling" by either the
lawyer or his client, the purchaser or lender. That alternative is for
the title attorney to check all records relating to a particular piece
of land back to the origin of the title. This latter suggestion- is
ridiculously impractical, of course, as the title search may cost the
17
client more than the value of the land on which the search is made.
B. Reasons Possibilitiesof Reverter and Rights of Entry Are
Problems to Title Searchers
1. Rule Against Perpetuities.-The basic reason that anciently
recorded possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for condition
broken constitute a problem to title searchers (as well as to purchasers
and lenders), is that these interests are not generally subject to the
Rule Against Perpetuities. s Thus, such interests reserved in the
grantor and his heirs or in a devisor's heirs have unlimited potential
vitality. Once duly recorded, they are potentially destructive of possessory estates hundreds of years after their creation upon the
"T To check a title to its origin in North Carolina would be difficult because the passage of time has seen new counties carved from older, larger
counties. As new counties have been added, new land registries have been
added. These new registries date only from the formation of the new
counties. Thus a complete title search to the time of origin would necessitate
not only a search of the record books in the county where the land lies but
also a search of all land registries in the counties from which the more
recently formed counties were carved. Both cost and time consumption
prohibit such a title search.
"SSIMES & SMITH §§ 1238-39. The rule in England is different, it being
held there that possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for condition
broken, like any other contingent future interest, are subject to the Rule
Against Perpetuities. Hopper v. Corporation of Liverpool, 88 Sol. J. 213
(1944), 62 L.Q. REv. 222 (1946) (possibility of reverter) ; In re Trustees
of Hollis' Hosp. & Hague's Contract, 2 Ch. 540 (1899) (right of entry);
Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 4(3).
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happening of a specified event. Anyone who certifies the title,
purchases the possessory estate, or lends money on the title, no matter
how remote from the time of the creation of the right of entry for
condition broken or possibility of reverter, takes subject to recorded
notice of the possibility that the possessory estate will be terminated
upon the occurrence of the event, though created at a remote time, by
a remote grantor long dead.
2. Statute of Limitations.-Norwill the title searchers' staunchest friends, the statutes of limitations currently in force, simplify
their task in making land titles which are potentially subject to these
interests any more secure. There are two reasons for this assertion.
First, existing adverse possession statutes of limitations which bar
rights in land and create, title in the adverse possessor do not become
operative and do not start to run against the owner of an interest
in land adversely held until the ownei of the interest has a right to
possession of the land. 19 In addition, even after the occurrence of
'the condition or event terminating or making terminable the possessory estate, the adverse possession statutes do not aid the title
seLfchei' itmaking. his decision to give or 'efuse a"certificate of
indefeasible title to land. Facts passing title to land by adverse
possession are.not self proving. The question of whether'there has
'been an occurrence of an event, or breach *of condition which will
start the adverse possession statutes to run is not easy to ascertain.
Further, such questions as what in fact constitutes a sufficient act to
*forfeit,the estate or whether the event renders the estate merely
"subject to forfeiture," must be ascertained. What a court will
say about all these matters is often discoverable only from facts outside'the title record books, after evidence, extrinsic to any record,
has been introduced in a full dress lawsuit which is tried to completion. It would seem obvious that the title lawyer should be loathe to
state that an interest has been extinguished because of any adverse
possession statute, even if the facts are unequivocal.
3. Changed Circumstances.-The doctrine of "changed circumstances" gives no help or encouragement to the title attorney. While
many jurisdictions have held that covenants in conveyances which
" Adverse possession will not run against the owner of a future interest
in land unless he has a legal power to stop it. Eason v. Spence, 232 N.C.
579, 61 S.E.2d 717 (1950); BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES § 55 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as BASYE]; 2 PowELL, op. cit. supra note 13, 301; RnSTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 222 (1936); SIMES & SMITH § 1962.
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impose restrictions in the form of equitable servitudes on land become unenforceable when changed circumstances make their enforcement inequitable,2" there has been traditionally little inclination
on the part of the courts to apply this equitable doctrine to terminate
possibilities of reverter or rights of entry for condition broken even
though the limitations on which they are based have become obsolete
or worthless.2 ' Even if the courts adopt the liberal view declaring
conditions on which these interests are predicated void and inoperable,
the question of whether a particular court would declare a particular
limitation or condition to be inoperable to terminate or to warrant
forfeiture of an existing possessory estate could not be positively
answered by a title attorney. Instead, he would be forced to wait
until a title clearing action in the nature of a quiet title suit has been
properly brought and the facts of obsolescence, worthlessness and
unconscionableness in enforcing the limitation or condition has been
judicially determined with finality. That "changed circumstances"
may render a condition or limitation obsolete and unenforceable is
thus of little assistance to the title attorney in his prophecy of title
unless he wishes to gamble on facts outside the records or on what
a court may find.
The same reasoning applies to dispel any comfort that a title
searching attorney may take from the incontrovertible assiduousness
of courts generally 2 to exercise resourcefulness in finding restrictions on the use of land to be mere covenants and not forfeiting conditions or limitations. This resourcefulness of the courts, though
perhaps salutary in particular cases, is inadequate to aid title searchers
because until the court has spoken finally in a lawsuit in which all
necessary interested parties have been joined, there is only a guess
as to whether or not some court in the future will declare a particular
"0 Logan v. Sprinkle, 256 N.C. 41, 123 S.E.2d 209 (1961); Shuford v.
Asheville Oil Co., 243 N.C. 636, 91 S.E.2d 903 (1956); Muilenburg v.
Blevins, 242 N.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 493 (1955); Bass v. Hunter, 216 N.C.
505, 5 S.E.2d 558 (1939); Elrod v. Phillips, 214 N.C. 472, 199 S.E. 722
(1938) ; Starkey v. Gardner, 194 N.C. 74, 138 S.E. 408 (1927).
See Murray v. Trustees of Lane Seminary, 1
2 SIMES & SMITH § 1992.
Ohio Op. 2d 236, 140 N.E.2d 577 (C.P. 1956). But see Wedum-Aldahl Co.
v. Miller, 18 Cal. App. 2d 745, 64 P.2d 762 (1937); Letteau v. Ellis, 122
Cal. App. 588, 10 P.2d 496 (1932); Cole v. Colorado Springs Co., 381 P.2d
13 (Colo. 1963).
McCall 360-61. See, e.g.,
22These courts include North Carolina.
Carolina & N. W. Ry. v. Carpenter, 165 N.C. 465, 81 S.E. 682 (1914) ; Saint
Peter's Church v. Bragaw, 144 N.C. 126, 56 S.E. 688 (1907).
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clause to be forfeiting. Title searching attorneys should not take
this risk.
4. Doctrines of Waiver and Substantial Compliance.-While the
doctrine of waiver may aid in a case in which the breach of a condition subsequent is alleged to vitiate the consequences of a breach of
condition, and may ultimately clear a land title,23 the possibility that
a given state of facts constitutes such a waiver cannot be relied upon
in the quest for marketable title until a court has made a final judicial
determination of such fact.24 Likewise, the equitable doctrine that
"substantial compliance" with the terms of the condition will excuse
eventual misuse of the land or violation of the condition2" does not
solve the problems of the title searcher. Obviously, the determination of whether there has been a "waiver" or "substantial compliance," as in the case of possible "changed circumstances," which
may make conditions no longer effective to forfeit or render a possessory estate terminable, cannot be ascertained by a title searcher
except by recurrence to data outside real estate records. In order
to make a clear record title and for the title searcher to certify the
existence of such facts that may make a condition no longer viable to
destroy an estate, something in the nature of a quiet title action will
almost always be necessary76
28

See note 22 supra.

*' Waiver of the condition giving rise to the right of forfeiture may
be found in a multiplicity of circumstances: acts, conduct, inaction, lapse
of time, or other facts evincing relinquishment of the right of forfeiture.
Actual intent to relinquish rights does not control. See Bernard v. Bowen
214 N.C. 121, 198 S.E. 584 (1938); Huntley v. McBrayer, 172 N.C. 642,
90 S.E. 754 (1916). See generally Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 1116 (1955).
'5 The doctrine of "substantial compliance" is that a court may not grant
the drastic result of forfeiture for breach of a condition subsequent if it
finds that the purposes for which the condition was created have been substantially complied with. In determining what is substantial compliance, the
courts consider the nature and objects of particular conditions and the
situations of the parties involved in determining the meaning and purposes
of the conditions. See Lassiter v. Town of Oxford, 234 F.2d 217 (4th
Cir. 1956), where land had been conveyed to a town so long as it maintained
a golf course thereon. The town leased the golf course to private individuals,
but the court held that the estate of the town was not forfeited or made
terminable even though private persons controlled the course, fixed charges,
determined eligibility of members, and passed by-laws regulating their
conduct. The court found substantial compliance with the condition.
2 For possible approaches to relieve property from the effects of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, see LEACH & LOGAN, CASES ON FUTURE
INTERESTS

&

ESTATE PLANNING

64-68 (1961)

[hereinafter cited as

LEACH

& LOGAN]. In practically all cases in which the land can be unburdened of
these restrictions, the status of the title and its marketability is uncertain
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LARGER PUBLIC PROBLEM-HEREIN OF MARKETABILITY

While too many title lawyers are totally unconcerned with the
policies of the law which make a title marketable or unmarketable,
it is submitted that the public generally has a vital interest in some
modification of the laws relating to possibilities of reverter and rights
of entry for condition broken. An example of the harm to the
public by these interests in their unregulated present status can be
readily demonstrated by a problem brought to the writer by members
of a small church in a small town in North Carolina. In 1890 a
member of the W Church deeded a plot of land to the W Church;
the deed contained the following clause:
The said land shall be used for church purposes only and when it
ceases to be used for church purposes, this deed shall be null and
void and it shall be lawful for the said grantor, his heirs, executors
or administrators to re-enter the said premises.
At the time of the conveyance the land was in the center of an
unincorporated, sparsely settled community. A small church was
built on the land with sufficient room and space to accommodate the
parishioners in that horse and buggy era. By 1957, however, the
situation was entirely changed. The pleasant surroundings of the
former village had become a melee of service stations, commercial
garage buildings, television repair shops, grocery and furniture
stores. Further, the plot itself had become unsuitable for church
purposes for it was too small for a larger church or for present
parking needs. Thus, the church members directed a building committee to sell the old site, purchase new land in a more suitable location, and build a new church of adequate size and with adequate parking area to meet current and anticipated needs.
The old church site was found to have considerable value because
it could be utilized as commercial property. But when negotiations
with a particular buyer reached the point where the title was checked,
the forfeiture provision in the church's deed was discovered. The
prospective purchaser then informed the committee that he could not
purchase the land unless the forfeiture provision was released. Thus,
the church was faced with the seemingly simple task of finding the
owners of the right of entry for condition broken and buying them
out.2 7 But was it that simple?
until a court has put the matter at rest by deciding a lawsuit in the nature
of an
action to quiet title.
2 Possibilities of reverter and right of entry for condition broken are
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If the grantor is dead, who and where are the proper persons to
execute quitclaim deeds of release? In the absence of a will or other
valid alienation, this interest descends as any other interest in real
property, and is enforceable by those persons who happen to be the
heirs of the grantor as of the time of the happening of the even
on which the possessory estate is conditional.2" Since the period
which has passed covers several generations, there will probably be
a very large multiplicity of heirs of the creator of the interest who
would be proper parties to enforce the forfeiture provision. 2 This
multitude of heirs-most likely scattered to the four winds-may
never be found.30 Those found may be minors, in insane asylums
releasable to the holder of the possessory estate. Such a release, however,
must be made by an instrument in writing and under seal in North Carolina.
See Sharp v. North Carolina R.R., 190 N.C. 350, 129 S.E. 826 (1925);
Huntly
v. McBrayer, 172 N.C. 642, 90 S.E. 754 (1916).
"8Elmore v. Austin, 232 N.C. 13, 59 S.E.2d 205 (1950); Methodist
Protestant Church v. Young, 130 N.C. 8, 40 S.E. 691 (1902); 1 AmERICAN
LAW

OF

PROPERTY

§ 4.74 (Casner ed. 1952);

RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY

§ 164

(1936).

Since the Rule Against Perpetuities does not apply to limit the duration

of these interests, they may restrict the use of land to uneconomic uses for
hundreds of years. The classic case is that of a particular lot located in the
heart of the Beacon Hill district on Mt. Vernon Street in Boston, Massa-

chusetts. A condition was put into a deed in 1806 which provided that no
building higher than thirteen feet could be built on the lot. Jeffries v.
Jeffries, 117 Mass. 184 (1874). It has been said that the purpose for imposition of this restrictive condition was to enable the owner of a building
on the opposite side of the street to keep her cattle in view as they grazed
on the Boston Common. LEACH & LOGAN 58 n.24; Leach, Perpetuities in
Real Estate:Let's Get The Ride On The Rails, A.B.A. Sec. of Real Property,
Prob. & Trust Law 20, 21 (1960).
" While the Bureau of the Census of the U.S. Department of Commerce
has no direct statistics on the average number of lineal descendants surviving
a man upon his death, an unofficial approximation derived from available
data places the average number at ten descendants. Letter from Chief,
Population Division, Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Jan. 29, 1964. When this figure is multiplied by the number of generations
that may pass pending termination of the possessory estate, the number of
persons who must be contacted or whose interests must be pre-empted
increases greatly.
" In Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d
922 (1950), a professional genealogist and searcher for missing heirs was
hired by order of court in an action to determine ownership of land subject
to a possibility of reverter. LEACH & LOGAN 46.
The problem of a multiplicity of claimants and their location can be far
worse if the possibility of reverter or right of entry has been created by a
corporation as grantor at a remote time and the corporation has been dis-

solved. In such case all of the stockholders of the defunct corporation, their

heirs, devisees or their representatives, perhaps decades later, would be
entitled to share in the possibility of reverter or right of entry as assets of
the erstwhile corporation just as any other assets omitted from final distribution upon dissolution of a corporation. See Addy v. Short, 47 Del. 157,
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or married women whose husbands' signatures may be necessary to
validate any deeds they may execute. Further, since the holder of
the possessory estate cannot insure that he has procured the release
of all the necessary heirs, there will be no record on which the buyer
can rely without gambling that some necessary heir has not been
contacted. And even if all the proper heirs have been given adequate
notice, there is no assurance that each will consent to release or waive
his interest. Each has been given by the grantor a "privilege of
extortion,"8 ' a blackmailing club which may be held over the head
of the owner of the possessory estate to compel payment of a possibly exorbitant price. Nor is this power of extortion limited to
the grantor's heirs in North Carolina, for the General Assembly has
recently passed a statute making possibilities'of reverter and rights
of entry for condition broken alienable by both inter vivos conveyance and by will. 2 This statute, the principles of which have
89 A.2d 136 (1952); Saletri v. Clark, 13 Wis. 2d 325, 108 N.W.2d 548
(1961). The writer has been reliably informed of just such a situation in
North Carolina, as yet unlitigated. A corporation conveyed land to a
municipality as a gift upon a condition subsequent which provided that if
the land was ever used for purposes other than those specified (for a public
park for recreation purposes for white persons only), title would either revert
to the corporation or be terminable by the grantor corporation. After several
decades the corporation was dissolved. The municipality, in the meantime,
improved the land, increasing its value by the construction of a swimming
pool and other recreational facilities making it very valuable. With the
occurrence of the United States Supreme Court integration decisions, the
municipal fathers decided to sell the land to private individuals rather than
to operate an integrated public park at the site. In the words of one of
the lawyers who observed the transaction, all the representatives of the
stockholders of the dissolved grantor were "out in the wild blue yonder."
No attempts were made to secure releases of the possibility of reverter or
right of entry from the heirs or representatives or the stockholders of the
defunct corporation, the purchasers and their counsel electing to "chance"
the purchase, notwithstanding the fact that the municipality executed its deed
without warranty. The observer of this transaction stated: "After all,
lawyers have to be practical about these things !" It is submitted that the
purchasers of this land may find themselves with an unmarketable title, and
perhaps no title at all, if another careful, "practical" title lawyer discovers
these circumstances.
CORNELL L.Q. 587, 588 (1958).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-6.3 (Supp. 1963) provides: "(a) The conveyance,

8145

82

by deed or will, of an existing future interest shall not be ineffective on the
sole ground that the interest so conveyed is future or contingent. All future
interests in real or personal property, including all reversions, executory
interests, vested and contingent remainders, rights of entry both before and
after breach of condition and possibilities of reverter may be conveyed by
the owner thereof, by an otherwise legally effective conveyance, inter vivos
or testamentary, subject, however, to all conditions and limitations to which
such future interest is subject.
(b) The power to convey as provided in subsection (a), can be exercised
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writers,88

been advocated as salutary by some
serves to rejuvenate
these interests. It can create a market in these assets in that they
empower the owner to blackmail the possessory estate title holder or
prospective purchaser thereof who wishes to use the land in a method
or for a purpose which does not conform to a specified condition.
Thus, a prospective purchaser of such an interest can look up
breached conditions, buy it for a song, and exert his extortion. 4
We see now that the "dead hand" of the grantor has inserted a
clause which operates in terrorem to compel the use of land for which
it is no longer suited on pain of forfeiture if used for any other
purpose. And what of the persons who take upon such forfeiture?
These will most probably be complete strangers to the grantor who
by any form of conveyance, inter vivos or testamentary, which is otherwise

legally effective in this State at the date of such conveyance to transfer a
present estate of the same duration in the property.
(c) This section shall apply only to conveyances which become operative
to transfer title on or after October 1, 1961."
" See, e.g., McCall 361-63.
" See, e.g., Faus v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 146 Cal. App. 2d 370, 303 P.2d 814
(Dist. Ct. App. 1956). In that case the enterprising plaintiff discovered
numerous existing rights of entry conditioned upon a railway company's
ceasing to carry both passengers and freight over lots acquired by the railway
for its tracks in 1906. The plaintiff purchased the rights of entry from the
heirs of the various grantors under an arrangement whereby the heirs
would get 50% and the plaintiff would get 50% of the proceeds of actions
brought by Faus to enforce reverter rights or alternatively to compel the
railway company to pay the present value of the interest granted in 1906 by
"inverse condemnation" upon cessation of use of the land for passenger (but
not freight) traffic. LEACH & LOGAN 71; Leach, supra note 28, at 21. So
far as can be determined by the writer, Faus has succeeded in his objective.
See Faus v. City of Los Angeles, 195 Cal. App. 2d 134, 15 Cal. Rptr. 783
*(Dist.Ct. App. 1961). In the latter case Faus was held to have acquired
288/360 undivided interest in two ten foot strips which passed to him upon
cessation of use of the land for railroad purposes.
For an indication that this is being done, it is not necessary to look to
California cases. See the record and briefs filed in In re Burris, 261 N.C.
450, 135 S.E.2d 27 (1964), which involved the legality of the discharge of a
municipal employee by the city council and the municipality's civil service
commission. Land had been conveyed to a church and its trustees on condition that if the property should cease to be used for church or school purposes
the title to such property would revert to the original grantors or their heirs.
The city needed to acquire the land for its adjacent airport. But before
it could negotiate to purchase the land or institute condemnation proceedings,
it was alleged that the employee, with notice of the city's need, purchased the
reversionary interests from forty heirs of the original grantor of the land
for $1,000. It was asserted that the employee also made an agreement
with the holders of the possessory fee simple estate subject to a condition
subsequent that he would share with them the proceeds from the sale or
condemnation of the land by the city. The city discharged the employee for
a conflict of interest because his acquisition of the reversionary interests
hampered its negotiations for the purchase of the land.
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happen to be his heirs several generations after his death and who
may now live on the other side of the earth. Their shares are likely
to be fractionalized to a point where they are practically worthless.3 5
The ultimate result is that an unregulated legal sacred cow has
hampered alienability of the land and denied prosperity" to the
church, the primary beneficiary of the grantor.
IV.

SUBVERSION OF POLICY BEHIND THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES

The philosophy behind the Rule Against Perpetuities is that the
"dead hand" of past generations should be allowed to control contingent devolution of land toward ultimate vesting only within the
period fixed by the Rule.37 Thus, if it is possible that a contingent
future interest might not vest within the required period, the
limitation is void.3" As previously noted,3 9 the Rule applies to
9;In Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d

922 (1950), on facts very similar to the example case, land was devised to a
church "so long as they shall maintain and promulgate their present religious
belief and faith and shall continue a Church .... " Id. at 645, 91 N.E.2d
at 923. When the land became so enveloped by commercial enterprises that
a church could no longer be operated there, the land was given up and the
possibility of reverter allowed to vest in the grantor's heirs after expiration

of ninety years from the original grant to the church. Upon sale of the

land for distribution of the proceeds to the heirs entitled thereto, it brought

$34,000. Over 100 shares were paid out by a receiver. They ranged from
a high of $720 to a low of $6.25, the latter being paid to a great-great-granddaughter living in Buenos Aires. Leach, supra note 28, at 21. The decree
of the court awarded a total of $14,609.75 for fees and expenses of counsel,
a receiver, and a genealogist. LEACH & LOGAN 46. What better case can
be used to illustrate the folly, from the point of view of the grantor, of ever
creating rights of entry or possibilities of reverter?
"6In fact, there is a positive detriment to society generally. As a result
of the limitations of available uses of land subject to a possibility of reverter
or right of entry for condition broken and their in terrorem effect, there
will likely be diminution in the value of the land for ad valoren tax purposes,
constituting a threat to the tax base of the community.
" TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 268 (abr. ed. 1940). The law abhors
perpetuities, "because by perpetuities... estates are made incapable of
answering those ends of social commerce, and providing for the sudden
contingencies of private life, for which property was at first established."
2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 174. Indeed, the Rule Against Perpetuities
was first developed in its modem form to check the abuses of executory
interests. SimES & SMITH § 1236. See Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79
Eng. Rep. 504 (1620), which held that an executory interest was not destructible under the rule of destructibility of contingent remainders. SIMES
& SMITH § 1213. As a result of the Pell decision, it became evident that
some limit had to be placed on the creation of executory interests to prevent
land titles from becoming inalienable for an indefinite period of time. Ibid.
2"E.g., McQueen v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d
831 (1952). An example of the Rule in operation would be a conveyance
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executory interests and other contingent future interests but not to
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for condition broken. 40
Since the passage of section 39-6.3 of the General Statutes4
made these interests freely alienable, it is possible by employing apt
phraseology in drafting to completely thwart the policy behind the
Rule Against Perpetuities. For instance, instead of creating a limitation "to X and his heirs for so long as land is used for residential
purposes only and no longer and upon cessation of such use, then to
Y and his heirs," the draftsman could state: "To X and his heirs for
so long as it is used for residential purposes only and no longer."
This limitation would then create a determinable fee is X and his
heirs and a possibility of reverter in the grantor and his heirs. In
a concurrent or subsequently executed instrument the grantor could
then transfer his possibility of reverter to Y and his heirs. While
in the former case Y's interest would be executory and void because
it might not necessarily vest within the period specified by the Rule
Against Perpetuities, in the latter case, even though the potential
perpetuities problem exists, Y's interest would be held valid.
By use of what appears to be drafting legerdemain, antics with
semantics, so as to create a possibility of reverter or right of entry in
the grantor and his heirs initially, followed by a transfer of this
interest by the grantor, a future interest which in all respects is the
functional equivalent of the executory interest can be created in a
third party other than the grantor or his heirs, even though such
future interest is contingent and will not necessarily become vested
within the perscribed period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.4 If
"to X and his heirs so long as it is used for residential purposes only and
upon cessation of such use then to Y and his heirs." This conveyance
creates a defeasible fee in X and his heirs and an executory interest in Y
and his heirs and since the contingency upon which Y may take will not
necessarily occur within the life of lives in being and twenty-one years
specified by the Rule, the limitation to Y and his heirs will be void.
*
See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
'0 Charlotte Park & Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88
S.E.2d 114 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956); SxMEs & SMITH
§§ 1238-39.
"1See note 32 supra for the full text of the statute.
"2In Brown v. Independent Baptist Church, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d
922 (1950), a devisor left land to a church "so long as they shall maintain
and promulgate their present religious belief and faith and shall continue a
Church ....
" Id. at 645, 91 N.E.2d at 923. The will then provided that

of the Church should be dissolved or its beliefs changed, the property
should pass to ten designated persons. The final paragraph of the will gave
the residue of the devisor's estate to the same ten named persons. When the
church ceased to continue as such, the question arose as to whether the
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the Rule Against Perpetuities has any purpose in restricting the dead
hand's control over the devolution of property and wealth, there is no
justification for its being so easily thwarted. Logically there should
be no distinction made in applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to
functionally equivalent interests. 3
V. CORRECTIVE MEASURES
A. Prognosis Without Benefit of Legislation

As can be readily gathered from the preceding material, a
prognosis of the ills caused to land marketability by rights of entry
for condition broken and possibilities of reverter, without the benefit
of effective legislation, is not hopeful. It would seem manifest that
these ancient land resticting devices create, or are capable of creating, numerous problems relating to land ownership, use and conveyancing for the individual, the title lawyer and the public generally. " It is equally obvious that present case law and tools in most
limitation over of an interest to the ten named persons was void as an
executory devise which violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. The court
held that while the gift over to the ten named persons following the determinable fee was void as an executory devise, the same ten named persons
would take the property as devisees of the possibility of reverter under the
residuary clause of the will.
This holding allows a devisor to completely nullify the purposes of the
Rule Against Perpetuities by simply creating a determinable fee without
time limit and then disposing of the possibility of reverter by another clause
in the same instrument. If the same clause in the same instrument were

employed, orthodox doctrine dictates that the interest created is an executory

interest and must be capable of vesting within the period of the Rule. First
Universalist Soc'y v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892) ; Proprietors
of the Church v. Grant, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 142 (1855). Compare Fletcher
v. Ferrill, 216 Ark. 583, 227 S.W.2d 448 (1950); Edward John Noble
Hospital v. Board of Foreign Missions, 13 Misc. 2d 918, 176 N.Y.S.2d 157
(1958); Knowles v. South County Hospital, 87 R.I. 303, 140 A.2d 499
(1958); Pruner Estate, 400 Pa. 629, 162 A.2d 626 (1960).
" Chaffin, Reverters, Rights of Entry, and Executory Interests: Semantic
Confusion and the Tying Up of Land, 31 FotnDAm L. REv. 303 (1963);
Lynn & Ramser, Applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to Functional
Equivalents: Copps Chapel and the Woburn Church Revisited, 43 IOWA L.
Rsv. 36 (1957).
"' One important aspect in which the interests of the community are involved is where the existence of the future interests interfere with land use
planning which would be beneficial to the community. For instance, if there
is an existant possibility of reverter or right of entry for condition broken
the purpose of which has become obsolete (and experience shows that all
eventually become so), and these interests are imposed upon urban land,

their characteristic rigidity and immunity from equitable relief may play havoc

with privately motivated redevelopment of urban lands, rendering governmental interference and condemnation imperative where private capital might
otherwise perform this important function. "Because they are imposed by
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jurisdictions are not adequate to solve these problems and that legislation will be necessary. It will then be the province of this article
from this point to explore the feasibility of legislative action looking
toward solutions to the problem.
Any legislation attempted should endeavor to accommodate as
far as possible the interests of the person making disposition of his
property, the taker of the possessory estate, the public generally,
and of title lawyers and conveyancers. Its purpose should be to
extract the highest value from dispositive arrangements for all concerned and to minimize so far as possible the injurious consequences
resulting from land use restrictions which may operate unreasonably
into the future. The different legislative approaches to the solutions
of these problems will be considered first, with some analysis of
their strengths and weaknesses. A specific recommendation of
legislation will follow.
B. Existing Legislation
Some states have approached the solution of problems currently
existing by the "substantial benefit" or "merely nominal" approach.
These states have provided by statute that when a condition or limitation connected with a grant or conveyance is "merely nominal and
without actual and substantial benefit to the party to whom or in
whose favor it is to be performed," it may be wholly disregarded
and any failure to comply with it shall not in any case operate as a
forfeiture of the lands subject to such condition or limitation. 45
While the "substantial benefit-merely nominal" type statute is
salutary to aid in the extinguishment of useless, outmoded possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, the relieving of a particular
holder of a possessory estate from an onerous forfeiting condition
or limitation can be achieved only through a lawsuit. Since there
individuals with little or no restraint, because they are often given perpetual
duration, and because they can be removed in many cases only with the
utmost difficulty, they are the source of increasing difficulties for city planners
and others interested on over-all community growth." Payne, Effect of

Rights of Entry, Rights of Reverter and Restrictive Covenants on Marketability
(1957)of Title, A.B.A. Sec. of Real Property, Prob. & Trust Law 11, 12
E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-436 (1956); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 26.46
(1957); M NN. STAT. ANN. § 500.20 (1947); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 230.46
(1957). See N.Y. REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW § 1951
which provides: "No restriction on the use of land.., shall be enforced...
if, at the time the enforceability of the restriction is brought in question,
it appears that the restriction is of no actual and substantial benefit to the
persons seeking its enforcement...."
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is no satisfactory method of determining just when a condition or
limitation is merely nominal and confers no substantial benefit, until
litigation is concluded, the "substantial benefit-merely nominal" approach, used alone, cannot increase the marketability of land so far
as the general public, prospective purchasers and title lawyers are
concerned. Until full and proper litigation is completed,4" no one
can predict what will be held to constitute a "substantial benefit" or
what is "merely nominal."'4
Another approach employed by a number of states to render less
harmful these future interests is the "fixed period of duration ap-

proach."4

This statutory technique provides that the restrictive

condition or limitation terminates at the end of a fixed period. There
is, therefore, a maximum period in gross during which possibilities
of reverter and rights of entry can endure--either twenty, thirty or
forty years.49 The effect of these statutes, where applicable, is to

"'Such litigation will include service of -process on all interested persons
as in the cases instituted to terminate these interests under the judicially
invented "change of circumstances" doctrine. See note 21 supra.
" Sii Es

204 (1960).

&

TAYLOR, IMPROVEMENT

OF CONVEYANCING By LEGISLATION

"- While there are substantial differences in the wording of the statutes,
they are alike in setting a specific time for the duration of rights of entry
and possibilities of reverter. See SimEs & SMITH § 1994.
"E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 37e (Supp. 1963) (forty years duration;
applicable to terminate possibilities of reverter and rights of entry whether
existing at time of enactment or created thereafter); Ky. REV. STAT.
§§ 381.219, 381.221 (1962) (thirty years duration; applicable to both existing
and subsequently created possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, provided
however, that a possibility of reverter or right of entry existing at the time
of enactment of the statute may be preserved by filing for record an intention
to preserve it prior to July 1, 1965); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 184(a), §3
(1955) (thirty years duration; inapplicable if the specified contingency must
occur within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 500.20(2), (3) (1947) (thirty years duration; ambiguous as to
whether it applies to both existing and subsequently created possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry; apparently applicable both prospectively and
retroactively to these interests); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-2,102, 76-2,103
(Supp. 1961) (thirty years duration; applicable to both existing and subsequently created interests); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-4-19 (1956) (twenty years
duration; applicable only to interests created after effective date of the act
in 1953). Compare Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 26927, §§ 1-7, which limited the
duration of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry for condition broken
to twenty-one years, and applied both to existing interests and to those
created after enactment of the statute. The statute further provided that any
existing actions available under then existing possibilities of reverter would
have to be instituted within one year from the time of passage of the act or
be barred. In Biltmore Village v. Royal, 71 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1954), the
section of the statute that cancelled all reverter provisions in plats or deeds
which had been in effect for more than twenty-one years was held unconstitutional, in that it impaired the obligations of contract since no remedy was
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remove the conditions and limitations from the possessory fee simple
determinable and from the fee simple subject to a right of re-entry
for condition broken and to convert them into estates of fee simple
absolute. Upon expiration of the designated period coupled with
the non-happening of the specified contingent event which would
render the possessory estate terminable, the possessory estate becomes then an indefeasible and marketable estate in fee. Thus while
it is still permissible to create possibilities of reverter and rights of
entry, they can survive only for the period of time specified in the
statutes.
The "marketable title approach," a third statutory technique, is
designed primarily with the title searching lawyer in mind.90 The
theory of these statutes is that public policy does not demand that
every outstanding interest in land, once it appears on the land title
records, should remain as a permanent clog on title.5,. To effect
erasure of these interests of ancient origin, such statutes provide
that unless there is a periodic re-recording of claims to preserve
these interests: they will-be extinguished." For instance, suppose A
afforded in those situations where no breach of condition had occurred permitting enforcement of the'right of reverter or re-entry prior to the effective
date of the act. Compare Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. 2d 486, 130
N.E.2d 111 (1955), which upheld the constitutionality of ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 30, § 37e (Supp. 1963).
"0But it should be noted in this regard that what is good for the lawyers
may well be good for the country. If the period required for a title search
,can be substantially reduced and more certainty of titles achieved, commerce
in land may be facilitated and perhaps the costs of transferring and encumbrancing land can be reduced. In any event title lawyers definitely have
a stake of time and financial interest in making title examinations as expeditious as possible and in efforts to reduce the volume of records to be inspected to a minimum.
BASYE § 171.
82Ibid. The marketable title statutes where
enacted apply not only to
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, but also to all interests in land
of ancient origin-present and future, vested and contingent, possessory and
non-possessory, genuine and technical.
While the phraseology of the statutes varies, their common thread is
that the interests to which they are applicable will be extinguished if rerecording does not take place. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 10a, 12.1-12.4
(1959) ; BURNs IND. STAT. ANN. ch. 56-1104 (Supp. 1963) ; IowA CODE ANN.
§ 614.17 (Supp. 1963); MIcHi. STAT. ANN. § 26.1273 (1953); MINN. STAT.
ANN. ch. 541.023 (Supp. 1963), comprehensively discussed and approved in
Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957) (applying
specifically to possibilities of reverter and rights of entry); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 76-290 (1958); N.D. CEN. CODE § 47-19A-03 (1960); OIo REV.
CODE § 5301.51 (Supp. 1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 74(a) (Supp. 1963);
S.D. CODE § 51.16BO3 (Supp. 1960); Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 330.15 (1958).
See collection of statutes and commentary in BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES
§§ 171-80 (1953).
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has a possibility of reverter of record in land in which B has a
determinable fee. If the particular marketable title statute requires
re-recordation of possibilities of reverter within fixed periods of
time, failure to re-record these interests by their owners will pass
them out of existence. Title searchers and prospective purchasers
from the owner of a possessory title only have to check back a prescribed period of time to determine whether an existing possibility
of reverter or right of entry has been recorded initially or re-recorded, with the knowledge that if it has not been properly recorded
or re-recorded it no longer exists. 53 While these statutes seek to
capitalize on the dilatoriness of human nature to extinguish ancient
interests in land, and should be effective to shorten the labors of
title searching lawyers, their weakness is that they 'permit these
interests to be revitalized and continue to impair the marketability
of land if re-recorded in apt time by the vigilant holder or transferee
who has bought one of these interests with the design of asserting
its nuisance value.5 4 While title searchers are assisted, the larger
objective of increased marketability of land is not adequately served
because these interests can be perpetuated by re-recordation.
The fourth classification of statutory methods for diminishing
the adverse effects of these reversionary restrictions provides that
possibilities of reverter and rights of entry cannot be transferred or
aliened by their owners.5 5 Because these interests cannot be otherwise conveyed, prohibition of alienation may result in easier acquisition of releases from the owners of these interests. Yet the "clogg"' This theory has long been in effect in North Carolina as the basis of
N.C. GEN. STAT. §45-37(5) (Supp. 1963), which favors purchasers for
value and creditors by providing a conclusive presumption of payment of
mortgages, deeds of trust, and other instruments securing the payment of
money after the expiration of fifteen years from the maturity date of such
instrument or from the date when the conditions of such instrument were
due to have been complied with, unless the holder of the indebtedness secured
by such instrument files an affidavit with the register of deeds or makes a
marginal entry on the record in accordance with the statute that payment
has not in fact been made or that any other condition has not been complied
with. The primary purpose of this section was to promote freer marketability
of land and to facilitate the examination of titles where old and unsatisfied
mortgages and deeds of trust, securing debts, were hampering real estate
transactions.
Smith v. Davis, 228 N.C. 172, 45 S.E.2d 51 (1947).
54
Leach, supra note 28, at 23. See note 44 supra.
'This type statute has at least one merit; it prevents the inconsistency
of allowing the Rule Against Perpetuities to be circumvented in behalf of
persons other than the grantor and his heirs, achieving the effects of what
would otherwise be a void executory interest via the transfer of possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry to such persons.
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remains."6

ing potential"
Restriction of alienability of future
interests contravenes the modern trend that allows transfer of all
future interests, however contingent or infinitesimal.
C. Proposed Legislation

The most effective statute that can be devised will incorporate
the best features of the various statutory approaches made to solve
the problems caused by possibilities of reverter and rights of entry
for condition broken. The following proposals for statutes are
recommended for adoption by a state which wishes to maximize the
utility of these interests and to minimize the adverse effects to real
property conveyancing derived from them. A commentary on the
purposes and effects of the proposals will accompany the respective
sections.
The title of the act should be "An Act to Limit the Duration of
Rights Under Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter."
The first section should set forth the policy of the state legislature
in enacting the statute, and thus provide guidance for the courts in
its construction and application and also to indicate the reasonableness
and necessity of the legislature's action. While it is believed that
the proposals are constitutional, this statement of policy will inform
the courts why the legislature felt a need for regulation and thus
present the best argument for their constitutionality as a valid exercise of the state's police power. Therefore, section one is included in
the following recommended statute.
Section 1.Declarationof Policy.-It is hereby declared as a matter
of state policy:
(a) That land is the basic resource of the economy and that any
private arrangement that prevents its most economical use,
marketability and development for the needs of the people of
the state for residences, industry, agriculture and commerce
is against the public interest;
(b) That unrealistic and obsolete restrictions placed on land by
private arrangements may tend to operate to reduce the tax
base because their effect is a depressant on land values and
thus they operate to require proportionately higher taxes on
lands not so restricted and are thus against the public interest;
Simes, Elimination of Stale Restrictions on the Use of Land, A.B.A.

'

Sec. of Real Property, Prob. & Trust Law 4, 11 (1954). That this represents the current legislative view in North Carolina, see N.C. GEN. STAT.
39-6.3 (Supp. 1963).
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(c) That land use planning by public authorities in the public
interest has reduced the need for and utility of private restrictions on the use of land for private purposes ;57 and
(d) That reverter or forfeiture provisions of unlimited duration
in the conveyance of real estate or any interest therein in the
state constitute an unreasonable restraint on 58alienation and
are contrary to the public policy of this state.
Section 2. Thirty Year Limit on Possibilities of Reverter and
Rights of Entry CreatedAfter the Effective Date of the Act.-(a)
A special limitation or a condition subsequent, which restricts a
fee simple estate in land, and the possibility of reverter or right of
entry for condition broken thereby created, shall, if the specified
contingency does not occur within thirty years after the possibility
of reverter or right of entry was created, be extinguished and
cease to be valid. Any estate of fee simple determinable or any
fee simple estate subject to a condition subsequent shall become a
fee simple absolute if the specified contingency does not occur
within thirty years from the effective date of the instrument creating the possibility of reverter or right of entry. 59
(b) Application of Act. This section of this act shall apply only
to inter vivos instruments taking effect after its effective date,
to wills where the testator dies after such effective date, and
to appointments made after such effective date, including appointments by inter vivos instruments or wills under powers
created before such effective date.
The provisions of section 2 are designed to operate prospectively
only, i.e., to limit the duration of any possibility of reverter or right
of entry created after the effective date of the statute to a maximum
of thirty years and to give the possessory title holder a fee simple estate absolute in the event of the non-happening of the specified contingency within that period. The thirty-year period, which is necessarily arbitrary, could be made a longer or shorter period but is
placed at thirty years primarily for three reasons: (1) this span of
time allows a devisor or grantor to control the use of land he has
devised or conveyed for approximately one generation into the
future from the effective date of his will or deed; (2) the maximum

" See

LEACH & LOGAN 75.
" Compare Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 26927, §§ 1-7, held unconstitutional
(notwithstanding such a statement of legislative purpose) in Biltmore
Village v. Royal, 71 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1954). ILL. REv. STAr. ch. 30, § 37e
(1959) was held constitutional (even though no mention of legislative
purpose was made in the statute) in Trustees of Schools v. Batdorf, 6 Ill. 2d
486, 130 N.E.2d 111 (1955).
" Compare SIm-s & TAYLOR, op. cit. supra note 47, at 214.
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duration of most mortgages is thirty years; and (3) because thirty
years is deemed not an unreasonable minimum period of time for a
title search to land and any such restriction should turn up in all
ordinary title searches.
Section 3. Limitation on the Durationof Possibilitiesof Reverter
Rights of Entry Existing at the Effective Date of the Act If Notice
of Intention to PreserveNot Filed.-A special limitation or a condition subsequent, which restricts a fee simple estate in land, and
the possibility of reverter or right of entry for condition broken
thereby created, shall be extinguished and cease to be valid, unless
within the time specified in section 3(c) of this act, a notice of
intention to preserve such possibility of reverter or right of entry
is recorded as provided in this act. Such extinguishment shall
occur at the end of the period in which the notice or renewal notice
may be recorded and any fee simple determinable or estate of fee
simple subject to a condition subsequent shall become a fee simple
absolute. No disability or lack of knowledge of any kind will
prevent the extinguishment of such interests in the event no notice
of intention to preserve is filed within the times specified in section
3(c) of this act.
(a) Who May Record Notice to Preserve.-Any person having a
possibility of reverter or right of entry may record in the
office of the register of deeds for the county in which the land
is situated a notice of intention to preserve such interest, if
duly acknowledged by such person. Such notice may be filed
for record by the person claiming to be the owner of such
interest, or by any other person acting on his behalf if such
claimant is
(1) under a disability,
(2) unable to assert a claim on his own behalf, or
(3) one of a class, but whose identity cannot be established
or is uncertain at the time of filing such notice of intention.
(b) Contents of Notice; Recording; Indexing.-To be effective
and to be entitled to record, such notice shall contain an accurate and full description of all land affected by such notice,
which description shall be set forth in particular terms and
not be general inclusions; but if such claim is founded upon
a recorded instrument, then the description in such notice
may be the same as that contained in the recorded instrument. Such notice shall also contain the name of any record
owner of the land at the time the notice is filed and the terms
of the special limitation or condition subsequent from which
the possibility of reverter or right of entry arises. The
register of deeds of each county shall accept all such notices
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presented to him which are duly acknowledged and certified
for recordation and shall enter and record full copies thereof
in the same way that deeds and other instruments are recorded, and each register of deeds shall be entitled to charge
the same fees for the recording thereof as are charged for the
recording of deeds. In indexing such notices in his office
each register shall enter such notices under the grantee
indexes of deeds under the names of persons on whose behalf
such notices are executed and filed and under the grantor
indexes of deeds 60 under the names of the record owners of
the possessory estates in the land to be affected against whom
the claim is to be preserved at the time of the filing.
(c) When Notice of Intention to Preserve May Be Recorded.An initial notice may be recorded not less than twenty-eight
years, nor more than thirty years, after the possibility of reverter or right of entry was created, provided, however, if
the date when such possibility of reverter or right of entry
was created was more than twenty-eight years prior to the
effective date of this act, the notice may be recorded within
two years after such effective date. A renewal notice may be
recorded after the expiration of twenty-eight years and before
the expiration of thirty years from the date of recording of
such initial notice, and shall be effective for a period of thirty
years from the recording of such renewal notice. In like
manner, further renewal notices may be recorded after the
expiration of twenty-eight years and before the expiration of
thirty years from the date of recording of the last preceding
renewal notice.
(d) Applications of Section 3 of This Act.-Section 3 of this act
shall apply to all possibilities of reverter and rights of entry
limited on estates of fee simple, existing at the effective date
of this act.
The purpose of the foregoing section is to complement proposed
section 2 which deals only with interests created after the effective
" Id. at 216. Professor Simes' and Mr. Taylor's Model Act does not
provide for indexing under the grantor indexes the name of record owners
of the possessory estates in land to be affected at the time of the filing. While
their statute is sufficient in a jurisdiction which has the system of tract
indexing, such a statute does not seem as satisfactory as the one here proposed
in a state that has only "grantor-grantee" indexing. The Committee on
Improvement of Conveyancing and Recording Practices of the American Bar
Association has recommended that in any case such recording or re-recording
of a notice of intention to preserve must be indexed in the name of the record
owners of the land at the time of such recording or re-recording so as to be
effectively discoverable by attorneys employing the alphabetical system.
See Committee on Improvement of Conveyancing and Recording Practices,
Report, A.B.A. Sec. of Real Property, Prob. & Trust Law 73 (1957).
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date of the act. Section 2 would not result in shortening the period
of title search or render titles more certainly free of possibilities of
reverter and rights of entry without more because all of these potential interests would not be barred thereby-those created in existence and recorded before the effective date of the act could effectively haunt land title searchers, purchasers and possessory title
holders indefinitely. Thus section 3 seeks to provide a solution, at
least for title searchers, for all potential possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry, making them discoverable on any thirty-year check
of the title to particular land. This method of requiring re-recordation of these interests within the period specified, instead of an attempt to set a particular statutory maximum time limit on the
duration of all these interests, created both prior and subsequent to
the effective date of the act, is designed to prevent the act from being
vulnerable to attack as being unconstitutional. 6' As written, section
3 never destroys or extinguishes any existing interest; it simply
provides that they will be extinguished periodically if their owners
do not preserve them by recording a notice of an intention to preserve such interests within the specified times.
The re-recordation provisions would not seem to be unconstitutional. Retrospective legislation does not impair property rights if a
person holding such property rights is given a reasonable time within
which he may assert and enforce his rights. 2 Here the recordation
provisions for preserving old existing possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry provide for a simple and easy method by which the
owner may preserve them. If he fails to take this simple step of
filing the notice of intention to preserve as provided, he has only
himself to blame if his interest is extinguished. The section provides
that if the interest was created within twenty-eight years of the
effective date of the statute, it must be re-recorded between the
twenty-eighth and the thirtieth year of its existence to continue to be
" Otherwise, the statute would be subject to attack as an impairment
of the obligation of contracts, as a deprivation of the holder of a future
interest of his property rights without due process of law, and as being
retroactive, ex post facto type legislation.
" Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957) ; Gregg v.
Williamson, 246 N.C. 356, 98 S.E.2d 481 (1957). What is a reasonable
time within which to enforce a right barred by a statute of limitations depends
on the sound discretion of the legislature in the light of the nature of the
subject and purpose of the statute, and courts will not inquire into the wisdom
of the exercise of such discretion unless the time allowed is manifestly so
short as to amount to a practical denial of justice.
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effective and to prevent its extinguishment. If the interest has been
created more than twenty-eight years before the effective date of
the statute, the owner will have two years from the effective date of
the statute within which to record. The result is analogous to a
statute of limitations that bars and extinguishes the interest unless
the affirmative action of filing the notice to preserve is taken by the
owner.
Section 3(a) of the proposed statute sets out the persons who
may file a notice to preserve these interests under the act. In addition to the owners of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry,
it allows any person to file a notice on behalf of any claimant or
owner of such interest who is under a disability or unable to assert
a claim on his own behalf, or who is one of a class but whose identity
is uncertain at the time of the filing of such notice. It is contemplated that the re-recording provision is to be construed strictly
and that re-recordation shall be positively required even if the owner
of the future interest is a minor, incompetent, under disabling coverture, out of the state, unborn, or unascertained. It is provided, therefore, that persons may file the notice to preserve on behalf of these
persons who may be under a disability or unknown. The decision
to make the terms of the statute applicable to all persons under disability as well as to those of full legal capacity is made because of the
belief that marketability of land titles should not be fettered forever
by exceptions in favor of the legally disabled.63 The desirable effects
of quieting titles and making them marketable will outweigh the
occasional losses to persons under legal disability who do not assert
their rights within the specified time. 4 It will also be noted that
there should be no exception made in the statute to exclude governmental, public or charitable gifts or conveyances from operation of
the statute. If existing ancient interests in land are to be eliminated
and land is to be made marketable, the statute should not be emasculated by any exception. 5
Section 3 (b) of the proposed -statute specifies "what must be in
83
BASYE §§ 54, 172.
"'Id. § 172. The statutes of limitations of some twenty-five states establish a maximum period for the bringing of actions by anyone, including
disabled persons. In addition to increasing stability of titles, this provision
will reduce the volume of litigation involving old claims.
" LEACH & LOGAN 79; Committee on Improvement of Conveyancing and
Recording Practices, Report, A.B.A. Sec. of Real Property, Prob. & Trust
Law 73 (1957).
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the notice of intention to preserve these interests. The land involved
must be adequately and specifically described, the notice must set
forth the name of the record owner of the land against which the
claim is to be continued, and it must also set forth the terms of the
special limitation or condition subsequent giving rise to the claim.
It is contemplated that these notices must also be properly indexed
in the grantee indexes under the names of the person or persons on
whose behalf the claim and notice to preserve is filed and also in the
grantor indexes under the names of the record owners of the land to
be affected for the purpose of giving notice to persons dealing with
such lands that such claims exist.66
In addition to the foregoing statutory provisions, another provision is recommended which will limit the period of time within
which the owner of a possibility of reverter or a right of entry may
re-enter or bring an action to recover land from the holder of a
determinable fee simple estate or a fee simple estate subject to a condition subsequent, terminated or rendered terminable by the occurrence of the limiting event or breach of a condition subsequent.
Section 4. Limitations of Period Within Which Actions May Be
Brought and Land Recovered By Reason of Termination of Determinable Fee Simple Estates or Upon Happening of Condition
Subsequent.-No person shall commence an action for the recovery of lands, nor make an entry thereon, by reason of a breach
of a condition subsequent or by reason of the termination of an
estate of fee simple determinable, unless the action is commenced
or entry is made within seven years after breach of the condition
or within seven years from the time when the estate of fee simple
determinable has been terminated. Possession of land after
breach of a condition subsequent or after termination of an estate
of fee simple determinable shall be deemed adverse and hostile
from the first breach of a condition subsequent or from the occurrence of the event terminating an estate of fee simple determinable. Provided,however, that where there has been a breach of a
condition subsequent or termination of an estate of fee simple determinable which occurred more than five years prior to the effective date of this act, an action may be conimenced for the recovery of the lands, or an entry may be made thereon by the
owner of a right of entry or possibility of reverter, within two
years after the effective date of this act.67
'

See note 60 supra.
Compare ILL. IREv. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 1(a), 1(b) (1959).
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This section of the proposed statute is deemed desirable for a
number of reasons. Currently it would seem that if there occurs a
breach of a specified condition or a termination of a determinable
fee simple estate and there is no re-entry on the land or action instituted to recover the land from the person who holds the possessory
estate, there is no certainty as to when the person holding over after
such breach or termination will acquire good title. While he may
not have any subjective intent to hold adversely, this section of the
statute ascribes an intent to him by making his holding adverse and
hostile from the date of the breach or from the termination of a
fee simple determinable. Another shortcoming of current law is
that any holding over by a possessory title holder after a breach of
condition or termination of a determinable fee simple estate is that
the holding after the breach may be without color of title." Even if
the requisite possession, intent, and other elements for acquiring
title by adverse possession can be made out, such possession without
color of title would have to be for the period requisite for obtaining
title by adverse possession without color of title. 9 In addition, if
no color of title is present, the concept of constructive adverse possession imputing a possession of a whole tract from possession of
part of the tract, described in the instrument that is color of title,
could not be utilized. Another potential problem is that under
general adverse possession principles, there is no adverse possession
adequate to pass title and to bar actions to recover land unless there
is a continuity of hostile and adverse acts. Under this orthodox
reasoning, a single breach of a condition subsequent or limitation
might not be sufficient to bar the claimant of a possibility of reverter
or right of entry.
This proposed statutory section attempts to accomplish a solution
of these problems. It (1) affirms that the date of the breach of
condition or termination of a determinable fee is the date on which
an action to recover land or a right to re-enter arises; (2) it states
that any action or right of re-entry will be barred if not instituted
or effected before the expiration of seven years after the breach
Certainly no color of title will be found if the holder is the first taker
in a deed subject-to a condition subsequent or a deed conveying a fee simple
determinable and he holds over after breach of the condition or after the
fee simple determinable terminates by the happneing of the specified limiting

event.
" Twenty years is required in North Carolina instead of seven, which is
the period of possession required when there is color of title.
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of a condition subsequent or the termination of a determinable fee;
and (3) it obviates concern over whether there is in fact an adverse
holding over the period within which title can be acquired by a
holder of a possessory estate who holds over after a breach of condition or the termination of a determinable fee and whether there
must be a single or continuing violation.
The statutory section attempts to effectively relate to existing
causes of action to recover land and existing rights to re-enter land.
If any right to re-enter or cause of action entitling re-entry shall
have arisen more than five years prior to the effective date of the
statute, the holder of such right or interest will have two years from
the effective date of the statute within which to bring any action
or to recover the land. The statute should effectively limit the
time within which future arising causes of action and rights of
re-entry from the breach of conditions subsequent and the termination of determinable fees can be brought, and thus serve to quiet
titles and make them more marketable at an earlier date.
Two other provisions would be desirable inclusions in a statute
proposed to curb the adverse effects of possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry. Since the judicial doctrine of "changed circumstances" does not generally apply to terminate and render possibilities
of reverter and rights of entry unenforceable,7" it is proposed that
a statutory provision be adopted that will make removable the restrictions of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry from possessory estates when such interests become merely nominal or when
they cease to be of substantial benefit to any person seeking their
enforcement by re-entry or by action to effect re-entry. The proposed provisions follow:
Section 5. Possibilitiesof Reverter and Rights of Entry Not Enforceable; Changed Circumstances, Substantial Accomplishment
or Where Enforcement Will Be of No SubstantialBenefit.-No
restriction on the use of land created by a special limitation or
condition subsequent shall be enforceable by re-entry or by any
action instituted in the courts to effect a re-entry or forefeiture of
a possessory fee simple estate subject to a special limitation or
condition subsequent where it appears that the restriction is or
shall become of no actual and substantial benefit to the person or
persons seeking to have it enforced, or where the court shall find
that the initial purpose of the restriction has been accomplished
or that the restriction is no longer of actual or substantial benefit
"oSee note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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to the person or persons seeking to have it enforced by reason of
71
changed conditions or circumstances.
The foregoing section of the proposed statute will enable an owner
of a possessory fee simple estate to extinguish possibilities of reverter and rights of entry when their enforcement is no longer of
such substantial benefit to their owners to warrant the continuation
of their impairment of practical and valuable land uses and the
consequential injury to land utilization and marketability. While
the primary beneficiaries of this type legislation would be the possessory estate holders, adjudications that possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry are no longer enforceable against certain lands, duly
docketed of record, will become very helpful to title searchers also.
Although it would have a limited application, the other proposed
provision is designed to prevent the potentially necessary but ludicrous search for all the heirs of the stockholders of a corporation
that retained a possibility of reverter or right of entry only to be
later dissolved, thus leaving title searchers with a nearly hopeless
task of clearing title to the land. The proposed section simply provides that possibilities of reverter and rights of entry cease and
determine upon dissolution of any corporation to which either is
reserved.
Section 6. Dissolution of Corporation;Possibility of Reverter
and Right of Entry Ceases.-When a corporation is dissolved or
ceases to exist, any possibility of reverter and any right of entry
or re-entry for breach of a condition subsequent heretofore or
hereafter reserved by or to the corporation and affecting land in
this state ceases and determines.72
To gain the maximum benefits of these proposed statutory
sections in the event that any part of the act is declared to be unconstitutional, it is recommended that the following additional section should be included in the statute.
Section 7. Severability of Sections of Statute.-In the event any
provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or
circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other
provisions or applications of the act, which can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the
provisions of this act are declared to be severable. 73

"'Compare N.Y. REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS
Z2 Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 37d (1959).

LAW

§ 1951.

7'HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS 184-85 (1932).
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VI. CONCLUSION

The statute herein proposed will not solve all the problems that
may arise from possibilities of reverter and rights of entry, but
it is submitted that the major problems which exist or which may
occur are dealt with and will be eliminated by its adoption. While
"the quest for marketable title" is not ended for the title lawyer,
his labors and concern for certainty can be diminished by passage
of the statute. In addition, the proposed statute subserves and
strikes a desirable balance between the interests of transferors of
land who desire to dispose of their lands as they see fit and society's
need that land should be freely marketable and thus available for
its most economical and effective use. While legislatures are traditionally reluctant to pass legislation which will upset land titles, this
reluctance should not be observed in considering this legislation.
No interest in land worthy of preservation will be destroyed nor upset in any way, and the number of threats of uncertainty and the
consequent unmarketability of titles to land can be substantially
diminished if this legislation is enacted.

